

# REMARKS

UPON THE

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# ACCOUNT

Lately published, of the

Earl of *Galway's*

# CONDUCT

IN

*Spain and Portugal.*

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In a Letter to a Friend in *Holland.*

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*Spain and Portugal, &c.*

S I R,

**B**Y your last Letter, I see you have a great deal of Reason to wonder, that *Portugal* is become a daily Victim for the *English* to sacrifice to the private Animosities of their differing Parties, after having, with so much Eagerness courted the Alliance of that Crown, which was so absolutely necessary to the Interest

rests of the Common Cause, that without it, the High Allies wou'd never have conceived that great Idea of re-establishing the August House of *Austria* upon the Throne of the *Spanish* Monarchy; it being altogether owing to the late King of *Portugal*, that he was the first, who generously made this glorious Enterprize a Preliminary to his Treaty, thereby to restore to *Europe* that Balance, which it had lately lost, by the Union of the Two Crowns of *France* and *Spain*; at least, by that inseparable Tye, and mutual good Understanding, wherein both promised to Live.

You seem no less surpriz'd, that the *Portuguese* Ministers should all this while keep so profound a silence in an Affair, upon which, no less than the Credit of their Country seems to depend. As I am no *Portuguese*, I must not assume, either to approve, or reprove their Conduct herein; But to me it seems apparent, that in the present critical Conjunction, they thought it more prudent, to prefer a modest Silence to any open Complaints, lest they might wholly alienate the Hearts of a People, who more than once, have abandoned their proper Interests, rather than suffer in their Reputation.

Or,

Or, at least, that if the said Ministers did acquaint the King their Master with the Matter, as we must suppose they did, that Prince does for the present, wisely choose to sacrifice his particular, tho' just Resentments, to the publick Good.

Notwithstanding, by the Answers given in by the Earls of *Peterborough* and *Galway*, to the House of Lords, and their Lordship's Resolutions thereupon, of all which I have already given you an Account, you may find, that without having the least regard to that Prince's Reputation, the Fidelity of his Councillours, the Behaviour of his Generals, the Bravery of his Troops, or the Honour of that whole Nation; all these Transactions seemed rather to be the Consequences of a Confederacy already broke, than of a strict Alliance still subsisting.

I must here again put you in Mind of a Thing, which I often told you; and which, perhaps, cannot be easily conceived in other Countries; which is, that as often, as you wou'd draw any Consequences from the particular Proceedings of the *English*, any ways directly prejudicial to the Common Interests of *Europe*, your Judgment  
will

will be wrong ; for it is not with any such Design, that the different Parties here persist in their ordinary Agitation.

And as I have nothing new, upon this Subject, to add to what I have already told you, and that I know you to be so great an Admirer of Novelty, I shall entertain you this Post, by giving you a general Idea of the Contents of a certain Book lately published in Vindication of the Earl of *Galway's* Proceedings in *Spain* and *Portugal* ; for I know your Curiosity to be too eager to stay for the entire Translation of it.

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But first I must tell you, that that Lord has, in some of the publick News-Papers, disown'd his having any Hand in the said Book, giving it the contemptible Name of Pamphlet : But because, in as much as it relates to the *Portuguese*, there is hardly any Thing more said therein, than what he himself delivered in Writing to the House of Lords ; it matters not whether it was by his Order or without it, that it was published. 'Tis true, that in reference to the King of *Spain*, the Author makes use of some Expressions, altogether foreign from that Politeness and good Manners which  
we



we all know my Lord *Galway* to be Master of.

Moreover, you are to observe, that tho' this Lord was censured only, for giving his Opinion for an Offensive War in the Council held at *Valencia*, the 15th of *January* 1706-7. which produced the fatal Battle of *Almanza*: This Author notwithstanding, begins his Apology from the Time of his being first named to command the *English* Forces in *Portugal*, that he may have room enough to extol his Prudence, Dexterity, and great Fatigues, both in his Martial and Politick Capacity, at the Expence of all the *Portugueze* Ministers and Generals.

When you have the entire Translation of this small Volume, I don't doubt, but that upon your first Perusal of it, you will make the same Remark which I have made, and that is, that the Apologist endeavouring to make the Earl of *Galway* Author of all the good Counsels that were either followed or rejected, during the Time of his Command, when he comes to that, wherein it was resolv'd, that the two Kings of *Spain* and *Portugal* shou'd not pass the *Agueda* near *Cuidad* Pag. 4.

*Cuidad Rodrigo*, he speaks impersonally, but adds at the same time, that if they had done otherwise, they wou'd have risqu'd the unavoidable and intire Ruin of the whole Army. Now as you was an Eye-Witness, that my Lord *Galway* was the only Person that oppos'd the passing that River, the King of *Portugal* leaving it intirely to his Decision, and King *Charles* only declaring, That he did not desire so unreasonable a Thing as the inevitable Ruin of the Army of his Allies, merely upon his Account: I cannot see what Reason the Apologist could have in not attributing to his Lordship so signal a Piece of Service, as the saving, by his great Prudence, not only the Confederate Army, but the Persons also, perhaps of both Kings: And I begin to suspect, that he was afraid that some one or other might unluckily say, That the Enterprize in it self was not half so difficult as this Lord did represent it.

pag. 5.

This Apologist pretends to shew in the first Place, that it was intirely owing to the Earl of *Galway*, that the *Portugueze* made the Campagne in 1705. when he found it past his Skill to persuade them to undertake the Siege  
of



of *Badojo*. You know, Sir, better than I, that the *Queen Dowager* who then held the Government, the Ministers, and the whole Nation in general did not then, nor do now, desire any thing with more Earnestness, than to become Masters of that Place, the Consequences whereof were so very great, whether we consider them in reference to the Common Cause, or to *Portugal* in particular; and that they would readily embrace the Proposal of such an Undertaking, but that the Foreign Troops who were the best disciplined, and most inured to War, were reduced to so small a Number, by the Detachments which My Lord *Galway* had already made for *Gibraltar*, that there were not Men enough in the whole Army to surround the Place. Now what better Method cou'd the *Portuguese* Ministry take in order to prevail with the Court of *England*, to send new Succours whereby to enable 'em to secure that Enterprize, than by telling that General, and the *English* Ambassador, that without those Succours, the Army cou'd not take the Field? And that this was their Drift, is manifest; for no sooner were they made sensible by Advices from their

Envoy at *London*, that they must expect no Reinforcements for that Season; but the Count *das Galveas* open'd the Campaign so betimes, that in Conjunction with the Earl of *Galway*, and General *Fagel*, he took that very Spring *Valencia de Alcantara*, and *Albuquerque*, and the *Marquis das Minas* recovered *Salvaterra*, and took *Sarca*, as the Apologist himself confesses.

Pag. 8, 10.

Pag. 15.

Pag. 13.

He begins again to magnific the great Pains my Lord *Galway* took to persuade the *Portuguese* still to undertake the Siege of *Badajos*; but whilst he does their Generals the Favour, to publish the Reasons which they gave to prove that Enterprize Impracticable; which were no less, than that the Enemy was much superior in Horse; that there wanted Pontoons to pass the *Guadiana*: That they had not Ball enough, and that the Weather was so excessive hot, that there was no keeping the Field; besides, the Town being Garrison'd by Nine Battalions, and Fourteen Companies of Grenadiers, he contents himself with barely saying, That my Lord *Galway*, and General *Fagel* propos'd several Expedients, in order to remove all these Difficulties, without letting us know what those Expedients were,  
that

that we might be convinc'd of the ill-grounded Resistance of the *Portuguese*; so that he must either own himself a very weak Apologist, or that the Expedients were such as would not bear the Test.

He goes on, and lest we should mistake him for a meer Journalist, he assumes the Politician, and must needs dive into the *Arcana* of the Court, for he tells us, That the great Difficulties which my Lord *Galway* met with in persuading the *Portuguese* to improve the fair Opportunity they had, did proceed from a certain secret *Remora*, which he has wonderfully discover'd to be the powerful Influence which *France* had upon some great Persons at Court, backed by the Intrigues of the *Pope's* Nuncio: But this Influence, it seems, was of the same Stamp with that, to which our Astrologers would fain persuade us, and of which we are undeceived at the Expence of a few Days Expectation: For in less than one Week, the Troops began to draw together, in order to form the Siege of *Badajos*; so that neither this Reigning Planet, nor the Nuncio's Industry, had Force enough to obstruct this Undertaking; and those

great Persons, so influenced, of a sudden changed their Inclinations. And here I must confess, that this Author puzzles me to discover what Connexion could he find between the Irresolutions of the Campaign, and the Nuncio's persecuting the Jesuits, to draw from thence so extravagant a Consequence; when common Reason shews, that in a Court, where they are said to have so great a Sway, this was not a prudent Method for this Minister to take, in order to back the Interests of *France*; and much less ought he to imbroil himself with the *Queen Dowager*, who had the Government in her Hands at that time. In short, this Apologist was as much out in the Reasons he gives, why the King resumed the Government, as in saying, That he appointed the Prince of *Brazil* to dispatch all publick Business, assisted by the Duke of *Cadaval*, and other Ministers. But we ought to give some Grains of Allowance to an Author, whom we must suppose to have been bred up to Politicks, and State Affairs, in the profound Academy of *London Coffee-Houses*.



He enters next upon a Relation of *Pag. 17.*  
the Siege of *Badajos*, wherein the Earl  
of *Galway* behaved himself so very  
well, that I have often heard you do  
him that Justice: But I remember also,  
that you as often told me, that the bad  
Success of that Undertaking plainly  
shewed, that the Reasons alledged by  
those that opposed it, were not ill-  
grounded; and that the want of a suf-  
ficient Number of Men to surround a  
Town of so great a Compass, by its  
Situation, was what gave the *Mareschal*  
*de Tesse*, the Opportunity of throwing  
Succours into it. 'Tis true, the Apo-  
logist imputes this Misfortune to Ge-  
neral *Fagel's* not following the Dire-  
ctions given by my Lord *Galway*, be-  
fore he lost his Arm: But here he  
leaves us again in the dark, by con-  
cealing from us what these Directions  
were, and why they were not execu-  
ted. And to tell you the Truth, he  
relates the History of this Siege after  
such an odd manner, that it is visible  
to all, that the bad Success of it was  
unavoidable; and only adds, that there *Pag. 24.*  
was a certain Stone Bridge upon the  
River *Xevora*, over which the Enemy  
pass'd, and which might have been de-  
molished. Now would I be glad to  
know



know from you, whether this Bridge was built after that Lord lost his Arm; for if it stood there before, what the Apologist says of it, seems rather a Banter, than an Excuse.

This Author passes to the Operations of the following Campaign, but does not tell us, that my Lord *Galway* met with any Difficulties in the opening of it, though the Forces under his Command were mightily diminished, not only by the Detachment already mentioned, but also by another, which he let my Lord *Peterborough* have, in order to convey King *Charles* out of *Portugal*, and carry him to *Italy*; though this was contrary to the Disposition of the Treaty: And that the King of *Portugal*, and the Minister of the States-General, did both protest against it.

But as it is not to our Purpose to make any Reflections here, on the Designs of that Voyage, and much less on the casual taking of *Barcelona*, being a Success that seemed to have more of Romance in it, than of real History; but which in Reality brought the Allies under a Necessity of maintaining a War at the very Thresholds of *France*, and at so vast a Distance from *England* and *Holland*, from whence all  
the

the Succours were to be expected. I shall content my self with remarking, that those very *Portugueze*, whom our Author a little before, would have pass for inspired by *France*, and seduced by the Pope's Nuncio, for irresolute in their Designs, and slow in the Execution of them; are now, by his own Confession, after having made two Campaigns, and four Sieges but the very Year before, and had but little Rest in their Winter Quarters, ready to rake the Field with such an Army, as in the Opinion of all those who are well acquainted with the Country, cou'd scarce be more numerous, nor better provided. Nor could he deny doing the *Portugueze* the Justice, that they supplied the Admirals, *Leake*, and *Wassenaer*, not only with their Stores, but every thing else in their Power towards the speedy Relief of *Barcelona*. And here, whilst he tells us, that the *Portugueze* had provided themselves with all Necessaries for a second Undertaking against *Badajos*, he insensibly lets us see, that they rather chose to Besiege *Alcantara*, as most commodious to the Design of marching to *Madrid*; which according to this Author, was the Earl of *Galway's* Opinion.

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Pag. 29.

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Great must be the Change which a few Days can produce in human Inclinations, when the *Portugueze*, who hitherto, according to our Author, seem'd so lazy, and so averse to the Siege of *Badajos*, are now again, hastening all their Preparations, and proposing the same Enterprize; when, in all likelihood, it should appear more difficult to them, after so chargeable an Experience, as my Lord *Galway* himself did now acknowledge it to be.

Now, Sir, consider, whether there needs a clearer Evidence to prove, that when the *Portugueze* did oppose the Engaging in that Siege, it was for no other Reason, but that they were not provided with the Necessaries for so great an Undertaking. And it were to be wish'd, that they had persevered in that Resolution till the Spring-Campaign, of which the Apologist now speaks; for then they had a numerous Army, in a flourishing Condition, and very well provided for that, or any other great Enterprize. And it were much more to be wish'd, that they had not quitted this Design for that of *Alcantara*, notwithstanding the Reasons alledged by my Lord *Galway*;  
for

for *Badajos* being, in the *Spaniards* Opinion, esteemed the Bulwark of all *Spain*; the taking of it would make a greater Diversion, and a much greater Noise over all that Kingdom, than the Celebrated Pilgrimage to *Madrid*. Besides, The *Portuguese* would have a brave Inlet into the Enemy's Country, and at the same time secure the best part of their own Frontiers; whereby their Army might be at Liberty to march to any other Part, as occasion should require.

In fine, these headstrong Men were willing for once, it seems, to submit to the Earl of *Galway's* Opinion, that so they might oblige the Court of *England*, where it was also given for granted, that the whole War was to be decided by the taking of *Madrid*; and after having reduced *Alcantara*, *Meraleja*, and *Coria*, they proceeded without Opposition to *Placencia*, where this Author begins anew to blame them; for that in a Council held there, they appeared unwilling to march any further; but at another held at *Almaraz*, whither they had marched contrary to the Advice of all the *Portuguese* Generals, the Matter was hotly debated, and strong Reasons given *Pro* and *Con*. I shall only take

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notice



pag. 41.

notice of those mentioned by this Author. The *Portugueze* urged, ' That  
 ' they could not pass any further with-  
 ' out exposing their Army to certain  
 ' Ruin, without any Prospect of Ad-  
 ' vantage: That it was reasonable to  
 ' believe, that if King *Charles* had any  
 ' Friends, or Partizans in *Madrid*, some  
 ' of them would have come in to them :  
 ' That on the contrary, they received  
 ' no News from any Part to encourage  
 ' them to go any further ; And in short,  
 ' that they had no Reason to venture  
 ' their Army that way, without hopes  
 ' of any decisive Action.

' The Earl of *Galway*, on the other  
 ' hand, represented; The immortal  
 ' Glory it would be for the *Portugueze*  
 ' to reduce *Madrid*, the Capital of all  
 ' *Spain* ; that supposing the worst, which  
 ' yet was very unlikely, viz. that *Bar-*  
 ' *celona* were taken, they would still be  
 ' in a Condition to retreat home, af-  
 ' ter having exacted great Contributions  
 ' from *Madrid*; and in a Word, that it  
 ' would be an invincible Argument to  
 ' the High Allies, that the *Portugueze*  
 ' did fully and heartily perform all their  
 ' Engagements, if they marched directly  
 ' to that Capital City. To which this  
 ' Author adds, as his own Sentiment,  
 ' That



That if this Opinion had been follow'd, the Grandees, and the Councils, or Tribunals, who were still at *Madrid*, would have declar'd for King *Charles*, whilst the Duke of *Anjou* was employ'd in the Siege of *Barcelona*; and so in all Probability there would be an End of the War.

I thought it proper to send you a Translation at length of the Account this Author gives of the Debates of this Council, that you may see whether it agrees with that you gave me of it; for I remember you told me, That in the first place, the Orders which the *Portuguese* Generals had, were not so ample, as that they could answer for leading their Army Threescore Leagues from their own Frontiers, thorough a Country that was their Enemy, as daily Experience convinced them; that they began to be in want, the Provisions which they brought from Portugal being already spent; That moreover, seeing the Siege of *Barcelona* was so far advanced, that the taking of *Madrid* could no ways obstruct it, the main Interest of the Common Cause depended entirely upon the Preservation of the *Portuguese* Army; because if the Siege should happen to be rais'd, they would

be in a Condition to pursue that Advantage: And if the Town was lost, the Allies had no other Army to maintain the War, nor *Portugal* to defend it self.

I likewise Remember, that you told me, that to the Point of Immortal Glory, wherewith My Lord *Galway* endeavour'd to sooth them, They answered, that such a piece. of Vanity was not ground enough to risque at once so many Interests; and in this, they were in the right, in my Opinion, if they had not a mind to pass for so many *Don Quixot's*. Besides, that they thought it very odd, that My Lord *Galway* should say, that there was no likelihood of loosing *Barcelona*, when they all knew the bad Condition that Town was in; and, that the Duke of *Anjou* made that Siege in Person, assisted both by the Troops; and the best Engineer of *France*, whose Death, with other Successes wholly Accidental, conducted to its Preservation.

As for the third Reason given by that good Lord, I think it was thoroughly Confuted, by telling him, That granting, they might have been able to retire from *Madrid*, at the best, it cou'd not be without a Considerable Loss, seeing, they must be oblig'd to  
cross

cross Threescore Leagues thorough an Enemies Country, and without Provisions, and harrass'd daily by the Duke of *Berwick*, who was superior to them in Horse; and wou'd be by that time joyn'd without doubt, by some New Reinforcements: So that if the Army, shou'd by chance recover the Frontiers of *Portugal*; it wou'd be in such a wretched Condition, as not be able to defend them. And, as for what he alledg'd, that this was the only way for the *Portugueze* to convince the Allies, that they were willing to perform all their Engagements; they were in the right to tell him, that these did not reach so far, as to oblige them to expose themselves to an inevitable Ruin.

I know you cannot but smile at this Author's own political Judgment, of the great likelihood there was; that the *Grandees*, and *Tribunals* wou'd have joyned King *Charles*, when you are sensible, that Experience gave no room for any such Hopes; Neither cou'd he himself produce any better Grounds for it, than a bare Presumption; which would not, nor ought not to pass for Evidence with the *Portugueze* Generals, unless

unlets he first convinced them, that he was inspired.

Pag. 43.

Next he takes upon him to reprove those Generals for refusing to let My Lord *Galway*, have all their Horse, and 6 Battalions of their Foot, that with them and the Foreign Foot, he might march as far as *Talavera de la Reina*, and try whether he cou'd maintain himself in that Post; as if those Generals did not foresee that his Design was to oblige them to follow him the next Day, under Penalty of being exposed to be entirely cut off by the Duke of *Berwick*.

Pag. 42.

Then he remarks, that the same Generals, upon receiving a Letter from the *Portugal* Ambassador at *Barcelona*; began immediately to consult their own particular Interests, as if this were not natural to every Body, or were not consistent with those of the Common Cause; and that they positively resolved to draw near their own Frontiers. But what surprizes him most, is, that they should not alter their Mind, after seeing My Lord *Peterborough's* Letter to the Earl of *Galway*. And as the Stress of the Question lay upon the Probability of *Barcelona's* being, or not being relieved, I beg you wou'd compare the Reasons of both, and then tell me,



me, which carry'd the most Weight. The first said, that the Fortifications of the Place were in a very ill Condition, the Breaches that were made when King *Charles* took it, not yet repaired, and the Garrison but 8000 strong. My Lord *Peterborough* says in his, that he has a Body of regular Troops and Miquillets at *Martorel*, without specifying the Number, nor telling whether he designed to attempt the Relief of the Place; and only concludes, that if Sir *John Leak* should arrive in Time with the Fleet, the Enemy in all probability would be obliged to raise the Siege, and the Duke of *Anjou* to fetch a Round thorough *France*; so that the Issue of the whole Matter depended not only upon the Wind, but upon the Vigour also with which the Enemy should attack it in the mean time; which being supposed, 'tis evident that any Man, tho' never so little skil'd in War, must have concluded that it was a great deal more likely, that the Town would be taken, than reliev'd; which clearly appear'd very soon after, seeing King *Charles* himself, by My Lord *Peterborough's* own Advice, attempted twice to leave it in a Dragoon's Disguise, as you very well know.

But



But Providence wou'd have it, that the said Admiral shou'd arrive with the Fleet and Succours just in the nick of Time; for had he staid but 24 Hours longer, the one and the other had been of no use. From all which it evidently follows, that the *Portugueze* Generals had no Reason hitherto to alter their Opinion, especially considering, that all the heavy Baggage was already march'd towards *Ciudad Rodrigo*, as the Author himself takes notice.

Pag. 44.

But as this Apologist wou'd needs out of every Accident, create a new Merit for the Earl of *Galway*, when his Lordship has already so much of his own, that he need not borrow any: He wou'd persuade us, that it was owing to his good Advice, that the *Portugueze* preferr'd the Siege of *Ciudad Rodrigo*, to that of *Bajados*, by reason it was nearer to *Madrid*; and making them promise him, that as soon as it was reduced, they wou'd assist him to pursue his first Design; when you know very well, that in the Council held upon this Affair, all the Operations were propos'd, wherein the Time might be best employ'd, 'till there came certain Intelligence of the Fate of *Barcelona*; so that there needed no particular Endeavour

P. 43.

your

vours of my Lord *Galway* to persuade them to that Siege, and much less afterwards to the Journey of *Madrid*. For as this Resolution depended altogether upon the Court, and that it was already taken there so effectually, that as soon as *Ciudad-Rodrigo* was surrendred, they immediately began their March towards that Capital; sure, the King of *Portugal*, and his General's Opinion, ought to be allowed an equal Share, at least in it, with the good Offices rendred by my Lord *Galway*, and the other Ministers of the High Allies. And I am confident, if any other Prince's Army had made that long March, first from *Elyas* to *Alcantara*; from thence again to *Almaraz*, then back to *Ciudad-Rodrigo*; and from this last to *Madrid*, which is above 120 *Spanish* Leagues, there would not be wanting a Panegyrist, who would put a greater Value upon the thing itself, and upon the indefatigable Constancy of the *Portuguese* Troops. As for the Foreigners, their Number was so inconsiderable, that they were scarce worth the mentioning, tho' their Valour, upon all Occasions, deserved the highest Consideration.

From this Place, to the Day of the Battle of *Almanza*, our Apologist has nothing to tax the *Portuguese* with, that  
D might

might any ways redound to my Lord *Galway's* Advantage, except a Repetition of the same Reflexion which my Lord himself made in the House of Lords; and is, that the voluntary Delay (he ought to say unavoidable) which King *Charles* made in joining the *Portuguese* Army, was no less fatal, than the Resolution which the *Portuguese* Generals took against marching directly from *Almaraz* to *Madrid*. But, as I have already clear'd this Objection, I shall only add, that the very little which that Prince got lately by hastening to that Capital, tho' with a victorious Army, is a convincing Argument, that he would have met with the same Fate then, and shall always do, as often as he goes thither, if not speedily seconded with fresh Succours, especially while *France* is in a Condition to send any to the Duke of *Anjou*.

Now, seeing this Author has been hitherto so very particular in exposing the Proceedings of the *Portuguese* Generals, he ought not, methinks, to pass by so slightly the Resolution, which he says they took, of wilfully abandoning their Communication with *Portugal*, rather than King *Charles* should be forced to return back again to *Barcelona*. And certain

certain it is, that if he had justly censured this indiscreet and inconsiderate Zeal of theirs, I might perhaps close with him: For it was not allowable in them to leave their own Prince's Territories wholly naked and exposed, when the Common Cause received no other Detriment by their not complying, than King *Charles's* going back again to *Barcelona*. And it is beyond doubt, that if the Duke of *Anjou*, when he forced the Confederate Army to pass the River *Cabriel*, had but sent a small Detachment against *Portugal*, he should have found that Kingdom not only without Defence, but the People in such a general Consternation for the Loss of their Army, that of Necessity they must have submitted to whatever Laws the Enemy should think fit to prescribe. And here would I feign ask our Apologist, what Success could we promise ourselves then of the Conquest of *Spain*? Or, in this Supposition, what Apology could he make to the Court of *England* for the Earl of *Galway*? So that, if I be not mistaken, he ought rather to excuse this piece of Conduct of his, and varnish it over handsomely, than applaud him for the great Share he had in putting the *Portuguese* under such a Necessity as



made way for the Enemy, had they but improv'd it, to oblige a Confederate Prince to depart from the Grand Alliance; who, in the Opinion of all, was look'd upon to be the most necessary Instrument for facilitating the Success of this great Undertaking. And it is more owing to the Enemy's want of Thought, than to any good Conduct of his, that all this did not happen in reality.

This only Resolution were enough, in my Opinion, to eternize the King of *Portugal's* Constancy, the Integrity of his Ministers, the Zeal of his Generals, and the Bravery of his Troops; or at least, to deserve a Treatment answerable to so great a Sacrifice: In lieu of which, both he, and they, have been loaded with all those injurious Reproaches, of which I have already given you an exact Information.

Page 71.

I must not omit what our Apologist advances, that no other General, but the Earl of *Galway*, could be able to conduct the *Portuguese* to *Madrid*. If he hints at the Earl of *Peterborough*, I leave it to that Lord's Apologist to vindicate him: But if he means, that my Lord *Galway* could do what he pleas'd with the *Portuguese* Generals; or else, that nothing but the irresistible Force of his persuasive

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five Eloquence, could have prevailed with them to make that memorable March, he might have remembred, that he himself owns, that in the Council, held before the Opening of the Campaign, it was agreed unanimously to enter into *Spain*, and penetrate even as far as *Madrid*: So that there his Lordship's Eloquence had no great Share in the Matter. Next, that at *Almaraz*, his Rhetorick could no Ways prevail with them to advance farther, and consequently was quite lost upon them. Page 29.

And last of all, that no sooner they had the News of *Barcelona's* being reliev'd, but they all agreed, by the King's Order, to begin their March from *Ciudad-Rodrigo* to *Madrid*, in which my Lord *Galway's* Persuasion had no Hand, otherwise than as their own Convenience, or Inconvenience, determin'd them, according to the different Circumstances of Time: For it does not follow, that because that Lord voted always that Expedition, therefore it was wholly owing to him, no more than to any other of the Generals, who might be of the same Opinion. Page 42.

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One thing very observable in this Author is, That tho' upon all Occasions, he be so very particular, in exposing the Behaviour of the *Portuguese*, yet when he is forc'd to speak to their Advantage, he does it so slightly, as if nothing of what they did were worth taking notice of; for when he comes to talk of what pass'd in the Plain of *Tniesta*, he barely says, ' That some ' *Portuguese* Squadrons, tho' very weak, ' defeated several of the Enemy's, that ' appeared much stronger. Whereas he might have remembred, that three of those *Portuguese* Squadrons made Head against all the Enemy's Horse, and maintain'd the Skirmish alone with so much Bravery, and so long, that the present Lord *Tirawly* was heard to cry out, that it was an eternal Shame that such gallant Men, who deserved to be supported by the whole Army, should be basely sacrificed; upon which, Colonel *Killy* advanced, and brought them off.

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We are come at length to the Battle of *Almanza*, whose Loss the Apologist attributes wholly to the weak Behaviour of the *Portuguese* Horse; which, if it should be granted, is altogether wide from his Purpose; for what is laid to my Lord *Galway's* Charge, is not the Loss of the Battle, where Providence had the chiefest Hand, but the Temerity of the Undertaking, which wholly depends upon the Dispositions of Men. And seeing this Author has been pleased to make that Lord the *Primum Mobile* of all the Operations hitherto, he must give me Leave to attribute this also entirely to him: For tho' the *Marquis das Minas* was of the same Opinion, he had not perhaps the same Intelligence as my Lord *Galway*, who, contrary to this Author's Assertion, was the Night before the Action, informed by two Deserters, that the Troops expected with the Duke of *Orleans* had actually joined the Duke of *Berwick*, which was not only conceal'd industriously from the *Portuguese* Generals, but some were not so much as consulted, whether the Battle ought to be fought, or no: For *Don John de Azaide*, who was one of the Generals of the Horse, complained,

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you know, to the King his Master, that he should receive Orders that Night to march next Morning, without being ask'd his Opinion beforehand.

As for the Loss of the Battle in itself, you cannot but be surpriz'd to hear, that this Apologist should impute it entirely to the *Portuguese* Cavalry, who made up the Right Wing, because they did not advance in Time, and afterwards did not stand the Enemy's Charge; when it is well known to all the Officers that were there, that the Ground upon which they were drawn, was such, that not only they could not form themselves in a Regular Line, but that no two Squadrons of them could possibly advance without Disorder, by reason of the Cragginess of the Situation. And I remember to have heard you often say, that the Disposition of the Confederate Army was such, that the most experienc'd Officers gave the Battle for lost, before they struck a Blow; whereas that of the Enemy was so advantageous, by having the Town and Castle of *Almanza* in their Center, that tho' the Confederate Army had been double the Number, they must have lost the Day. What Success



What Success then cou'd be expected from that rash Attempt, when the Enemies Superiority was, as you well know, and the Author himself confesses, so very great, that in order to make a Front equal to theirs, My Lord *Galway* was forced not only to weaken his first Line, by extending it, but also to leave great Intervals, by which the Enemies Horse entering, put that of the *Portugeze* soon into Disorder, and afterwards quite broke them. Nor did the Left-Wing, it seems, fare much betrer; for notwithstanding what Encomiums our Author gives them, I remember you told me, that no sooner were their Foot decoyed to the Walls of *Almanza*, and there cut off, but the Enemy came down with their Horse and Foot, and drove all before them; the *English* Battalion of Foot-Guards being the very first that gave way. And that you cou'd appeal to all that were present on that side, whether the *Portugueze* Horse, under the Command of the Count *de Attalaya*, in the Left-Wing, did not signalize themselves, and kept the Field to the very last, tho' he himself was dangerously wounded. And that for the *Portugueze* Foot, it was Argument enough of their Bravery, that they were the

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only Battalions that stood to be cut down in their Ranks. 'Tis true, My Lord *Galway* cou'd not observe all those Circumstances, as having been wounded in the very Beginning of the Action, and consequently obliged to leave the Field, ~~and so forth.~~

The Battle, in short, was lost, and the Blame must be laid somewhere; and I must confess, that it is with Nations as with particular Men, who wou'd willingly ingross to themselves the Honor of all great Actions, and throw, if possible, the Blame of all Miscarriages upon their Neighbours Shoulders, which they always suppose broad enough for such a Burthen. But it is carrying the Matter too far, to endeavour to justify the visible ill Conduct of any one Person, at the Expence of a whole Nation.

Now it appears manifest, by what this Author immediately suggests, that even in his own Opinion, there was from the Beginning, but little Probability of gaining that Battle; for he says,

‘ That if the *Portugueze* had stood well  
 ‘ their Ground, the Confederates  
 ‘ might at least, make an honourable  
 ‘ Retreat, which, considering the vast  
 ‘ Disproportion of Forces, wou'd have  
 ‘ gained them the Honour of the Day,  
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Here I must put you in Mind of what you once told me, and of which I had the Confirmation from a very able Officer that was in the Battle, That if My Lord *Galway* had but left two or three Squadrons in the Rear of his Center, to cover afterwards his Retreat, he might have carry'd off his Foot and Artillery, in spite of the Duke of *Berwick's* whole Army, tho' it were twice the Number.

What put the Confederate Army upon a Necessity of marching four *Spanish* Leagues, to fight this Battle, was, if we may credit this Apologist ; First, because they wou'd not give Time to the Troops that came with the Duke of *Orleans*, to join the Duke of *Berwick*. But I am confident, that as to this Point, he had not his Instructions from My Lord *Galway*, who, as I have already noted, had certain Intelligence of their Arrival.

The second Reason he gives, is, because they wanted Provisions : But this does not well agree with what he tells of destroying the Enemy's Magazines ; which so provident a General as the Earl of *Galway*, might have saved, for the Benefit of his Army, if he had been really in Want.

· A third Reason which he supposes, is, Because they should not loose their Communication with *Valencia*, from whence they got their Provisions; but is mistaken, for the Army was then actually upon the Frontiers of that Kingdom, and the Project agreed upon, of marching, as you know, to *Arragon*, and join the Troops that were cantoned there: And by doubling the Head of the River *Tagus*, to penetrate into *Castile*, as he himself owns. And it is not likely, that if this were put in Execution, the Enemy would amuse themselves with destroying the Inhabitants of *Valencia*, as he would persuade us, the Earl of *Galway* apprehended, but rather hasten immediately to the Relief of their Capital, thus threatned by the Allies. Not that you, nor I, nor any honest Man, can reasonably doubt, but that the Earl of *Galway's* Intentions were very good, and that to mistake the Measures of putting them in Execution, ought not to be imputed to him as a Crime.

After this, our Apologist says, neither good, nor bad of the *Portuguese*, till he comes to the Skirmish they lost near the *Godinba*, which he plainly affirms, to be fought contrary to my Lord *Galway's*

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Galways's Opinion; this, I suppose, he had from the *London Gazette*, that is not always Gospel. I am not certain, whether you know, that as soon as this Passage was known in *Portugal*, my Lord himself was obliged to write to the Secretary of State of that Kingdom, that he was mightily surprized at this Expression of the *Gazette*; for tho' he was not wholly of Opinion, that the Army should pass the River *Caya*, yet afterwards he was the chief Person that insisted upon giving the Enemy Battle, being desirous of coming to a general Engagement; because he thought this most convenient to the Interests of the Common Cause; and besides, had a Prospect that it would prove a Glorious Day to him.

It can't be denied, that the *Portuguese* Horse behaved themselves but poorly in that Action. But you know, that it could not with Reason be expected otherwise, from a Body of Troops just newly raised, and that scarce ever saw a Pistol fired. And for ought as I know, one of the chief Qualifications required in a good General, is to know, what the Men under his Command are, and what they are whom he is to fight, that so he may ballance the Number of  
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the one, with the Experience of the other. And let me tell you, that all Impartial People, who knew *Portugal*, did not a little wonder, that that Kingdom, after having lost its whole Army, should be able to raise another so speedily, without any extraordinary Assistance from the Confederates; but on the contrary, that the *Dutch*, ever since the Battle of *Almanza*, began to neglect the Payment of the ordinary Subsidies.

This is what the aforesaid Book has, in Reference to the *Portuguese*, whose Part I have taken, out of pure Love to Justice, without pretending in the least to lessen the Glory, which my Lord *Galway* might otherwise have acquired, had he been more fortunate. For my Design is only to lay open to your View, the weak Reasonings of his ill-informed Apologist, believing at the same time, that Declaration of his Lordship, wherein he Disowns having any Hand in the publishing of such a Pamphlet. For I look upon it to be the last Misfortune that can befall any great Man, to be obliged to have Recourse to another Man's Pen, for to justify his Proceedings.

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